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http://ir.ncue.edu.tw/ir/handle/987654321/16708
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題名: | Two-Person Red-and-Black Games with Bet-Dependent Win Probability Functions |
作者: | Chen, May-Ru;Hsiau, Shoou-Ren |
貢獻者: | 數學系 |
關鍵詞: | Red-and-black game;Bold strategy;Timid strategy;Convex function;Nash equilibrium |
日期: | 2006-12
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上傳時間: | 2013-06-05T07:41:08Z
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出版者: | Applied Probability Trust |
摘要: | In this paper a two-person red-and-black game is investigated. We suppose that, at every stage of the game, player I's win probability, f, is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players' bets. Two results are given: (i) if f is convex then a bold strategy is optimal for player I when player II plays timidly; and (ii) if f satisfies f(s)f(t) ≤ f(st) then a timid strategy is optimal for player II when player I plays boldly. These two results extend two formulations of red-and-black games proposed by Pontiggia (2005), and also provide a sufficient condition to ensure that the profile (bold, timid) is the unique Nash equilibrium for players I and II. Finally, we give a counterexample to Pontiggia's conjecture about a proportional N-person red-and-black game. |
關聯: | Journal of Applied Probability, 43(4): 905-915 |
顯示於類別: | [數學系] 期刊論文
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