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NCUEIR > College of Management > Department of Accounting > Periodical Articles > Item 987654321/17096

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.ncue.edu.tw/ir/handle/987654321/17096

Title:	更換威脅對會計師獨立性之影響 The Effect of Dismissal Threat on Auditor Independence
Authors:	張文瀞;周玲臺;林修葳
Contributors:	會計學系
Keywords:	更換威脅;更換會計師;審計意見;會計師獨立性 Dismissal threat;Auditor switch;Audit opinion;Auditor independence
Date:	2005-10
Issue Date:	2013-07-15T04:05:24Z
Publisher:	中華會計教育學會
Abstract:	This study investigates whether the dismissal threat posed by the client jeopardizes auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern opinion on a financially distressed client. We use an auditor switch model to predict the unobserved switches clients would have made had they received an opposite audit opinion, and then measure the unobserved switch probability as a proxy for the dismissal threat. This study identifies two types of strategic response that may result from dismissal threats. One type is the client’s coercing the auditor to issue a clean instead of a going-concern opinion. The other type of dismissal threat is that posed by clients who request a shared opinion (involving other auditors) in lieu of a going concern opinion. We argue that whether auditors surrender their independence to these two dismissal threats depends heavily on the professional responsibility and potential future failure costs. The results show that the probability of a financially distressed company’s receiving a going concern opinion increases with the likelihood of dismissal to coerce clean opinions. However, the probability of a financially distressed company’s receiving a going concern opinion decreases with the likelihood of dismissal to coerce shared opinions. The difference between these two inappropriate audit opinions lies mainly in perceived disutility. Hence, market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, including the perceived probability of being sued, are essential to preserve auditor independence. 鑒於不利的審計意見會對公司產生一些負面後果(如股價下跌和不易募集資金等)，管理當局便萌生對會計師施加壓力之誘因。Carcello and Neal(2000)認為撤換會計師是公司對會計師施加壓力之方法之一，因此，本文目的在探討更換威脅對會計師獨立性之影響，亦即，當受查客戶不願收到不利的審計意見而以撤換會計師為由脅迫現任簽證會計師時，受查客戶是否可成功地取得較有利的審計意見。
Relation:	中華會計學刊, 6(1): 97-123
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting] Periodical Articles

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