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題名: The Effect of Family Shareholders on Firms Leverage
作者: Lin. Shu-hui
貢獻者: 商業教育學系
日期: 2009
上傳時間: 2010-11-15T06:52:33Z
摘要: In this study, we explore the relation between family shareholders and debt usage decisions by examining the effects of family ownership, control, and management on financial leverage. We find family ownership, control, and management have differential effects on financial leverage. Moreover, our results show that when suffering serious agency problems of debt, firms with higher family ownership operate at a higher level of debt, while those with higher family control and with family management operate at a lower level of debt. Our findings suggest that high family ownership helps to align the interests of controlling families and debt holders. However, family shareholders with tight control over a firm and occupying the CEO position have a detrimental effect on the relation between the families and creditors.
關聯: 2009 當代管理論壇學術研討會, 彰化師大技術及職業教育學院商業教育學系, 2009年06月05日
顯示於類別:[商業教育學系] 會議論文

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