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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.ncue.edu.tw/ir/handle/987654321/9827

Title: Do executive stock options certainly boost firm performance?
Authors: Wu, Ming-Cheng;Yang, Chang-Tyan;Huang, Yi-Ting;Chen, Yi-Jyun
Contributors: 會計系
Date: 2010-07
Issue Date: 2012-04-27T03:05:49Z
Abstract: This paper focuses on the granted effect of executive stock option on earnings management and firm unmanaged performance. Whether it is worth that companies issue ESO in exchange of future profitability. Because of the two-years vesting period regulation, to examine the granted effect of ESO more precisely, we separate the incentive ratio of ESO into three parts, the granted year, the year after granted year and the exercisable year. Empirical results not only prove that ESO cause managers to engage in earnings management, but also show that even in response to earnings management, ESO encourages managers to think from shareholders’ perspective and to raise the real profitability of companies. In addition, companies could reduce the use of discretionary accruals by adjusting governance structure with more monitoring power.
Relation: 2010 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, July 31-August 4, 2010
Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 會議論文

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